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RECENT CASES
HIGHWAYS - INSURANCE - Right of Indemnified Claimant to
Sue Highway Department. Plaintiff attempted to transport some
heavy road machinery across the Inland Waterway on a ferry oper-
ated by the South Carolina Highway Department. The machinery
was damaged when submerged due to alleged defects in the ferry.
Plaintiff was indemnified by an insurance company and now brings
suit against the Highway Department under Section 5887 of the
1942 Code of Laws for South Carolina. Defendant contends that
plaintiff is barred from bringing this action because he has been.
indemnified by the insurance company and is not the real party in
interest. A demurrer to the defenses was sustained. On appeal,
HELD, affirmed. One whose property is damaged by defects in
the highway system may maintain an action against the Highway
Department even though he has been indemnified and the action is
prosecuted merely for the subrogee's benefit. Jeff Hunt Machinery
Co. v. South Carolina State Highway Department, 217 S. C. 423,
60 S. E. 2d 859 (1950).
It is elementary that a statute must be construed to effectuate the
intent of the legislature. Sanders v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 95
S. C. 36, 78 S. E. 532 (1913) ; Pickens v. Maxwell Bros. & Quinn,
176 S. C. 404, 180 S. E. 348 (1935). Any legislative act in dero-
gation of a state's sovereign right of immunity from liability and
suit are to be strictly construed, but not to such an extent as to
defeat legislative intent. Rushton v. S. C. State Highway Dept.,
207 S. C. 112, 34 S. E. 2d 484 (1945). From this strict interpretation
the court has long stated that a surety, after settling with the in-
sured under the terms of a policy for injuries received due to de-
fects in the state highway, could not sue the State Highway Depart-
ment in its own name under the theory of subrogation, since Section
5887 of the S. C. Code of 1942 limits such actions to a "person,
firm or corporation who may suffer . . . damage to his . . . pro-
perty . . ." U. S. Casualty Co. v. State Highway Department, 155
S. C. 77, 151 S. E. 887 (1929). In the ordinary case where an
insurance company pays a claim under a policy and becomes sub-
rogated to the rights of the insured, the insurer may still bring the
action against the party causing the injury in the name of the in-
sured since an indemnified insured is regarded as trustee for the
insurer. Mobile Insurance Co. v. Columbia Ry., 41 S. C. 408, 19
S. E. 858 (1894). The insured still remains the real party in interest
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despite the fact that he has been compensated by the insurance com-
pany. S. C. CODE. op LAWS § 397 (1942); People's Oil Co. v.
Charleston Ry., 83 S. C. 530, 65 S. E. 733 (1908). A payment by
an insurance company for part or all of a loss suffered by the in-
jured party does not reduce the liability of the party causing such
damage. Farmers Mercantile Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 102
S. C. 348, 86 S. E. 678 (1915). It is no defense in an action against
a wrongdoer that the party seeking recovery was insured against
the loss and recovered the amount of such loss in whole or in part.
Lyons v. Freeborg, 3 Wash. 2d 308, 100 P. 2d 1041 (1940). Re-
covery was recently allowed an insurance company who brought suit
in its own name against the United States upon a claim arising un-
der the Federal Tort Claims Act to which it had become subrogated
by payment to the insured. United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sure-
ty Co., 338 U. S. 366, 70 Sup. Ct. 207, 94 L. Ed. 171 (1950).
The holding in the principal case is the only feasible way that
would sustain justice. Had it ruled otherwise it would have pro-
hibited a citizen from exercising his rights granted by the state mere-
ly because the citizen was prudent and had foresight enough to pro-
tect his property by insurance. The plaintiff fulfilled all require-
ments necessary to entitle him to recover and the state is absent of
right to say what can or can not be done with the money after re-
covery. If the court had rejected the claim, it would have been in
violation of the Constitution as an interference with a lawful contract
between individuals. A contract existed between the insurer and in-
sured whereby the insured granted the insurer the right to recover
from a wrongdoer who harmed him if the insurer would pay for
the insured's injury. This situation would be unquestioned if an
amendment to Section 5887 of the Code would allow the subrogee
to sue.
MELviN K. YouNTs.
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION - CURIOSITY. - Employee
Injured by His Own Curiosity Entitled to Compensation. Claimant,
a garage employee, during working hours, but while he had nothing
to do, was sitting in the front seat of a police automobile upon which
another employee was working. Claimant opened the glove compart-
ment and took a tear gas bomb therefrom. Not knowing what it
was, he pulled the cotter pin releasing the contents which exploded,
injuring claimant's eyes and impairing his eyesight. The Indus-
trial Commission denied compensation on the ground that the in-
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jury did not arise out of and in the course of employment; the cir-
cuit court affirmed the commission's award. On appeal, HELD,
affirmed. Where an employee, while awaiting a work assignment
during working hours at his place of employment in idle curiosity
tampers with a strange object which is present by reason of the
nature of the employer's business, and is injured thereby, he is en-
titled to compensation as a matter of law. Jordan v. Dixie Chevrolet,
Inc ...... S. C. I 61 S. E. 2d 654 (1950).
The primary problem facing the court in the instant case is whether
there can be any liability on the employer when the injury was
caused solely by the employee's curiosity, at a time when the em-
ployee was not furthering the employer's business except by being
on the job. An injury arises in the course of employment within
the meaning of the Workman's Compensation Act when it occurs
within the period of employment at a place where the employee rea-
sonably may be in performance of his duties and while he is perform-
ing those duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto.
Schrader v. Monarch Mills, 215 S. C. 357, 55 S. E. 2d 285 (1949).
The employee's claim is not defeated by contributory negligence or
assumption of risk. Johnson v. Merchant's Fertilizer Co., 198 S. C.
333, 17 S. E. 2d 695 (1942). Defenses against the claim are in-
toxication of the employee, or willful intention to injure himself or
another. Reeves v. Carolina Machinery & Foundry Works, 194
S. C. 403, 9 S. E. 2d 919 (1940). There is some division of judi-
cial opinion as to the nature and degree of the relation of the injury
to the employment. The more conservative view being that the
causative risk or danger must be inherent in, or essentially connected
with, the employment itself. Dallas Mfg. Co. v. Kennemer, 243 Ala.
42, 8 So. 2d 519 (1942). While according to the liberal view, an
injury may be regarded as arising out of the employment if it re-
sults from a risk or danger to which the workman is exposed by
reason of being engaged in the performance of his duties, although
such danger is not inherent in and has no necessary or essential
connection with the particular employment. Gonier v. Chase Co.,
97 Conn. 46, 115 At. 677 (1921). Deviation from duty, caused
by the curiosity of the employee, would not bar compensation under
the latter or more liberal view. Derby v. International Salt Co., 233
App. Div. 15, 251 N. Y. S. 531 (1931). On the other hand there
would probably be no compensation allowed under the conservative
view. Cennell v. Oscar Daniels Co., 203 Mlich. 73, 168 N. W. 1009
(1918). There have been no cases in this state involving curiosity,
however, the Court has more or less committed itself to the liberal
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view; "The words 'course of employment' as used in the Workman's
Compensation Act should be broadly construed so as to avoid denial
of awards for any period when the employee is actively engaged in
working for the employer or while doing something reasonably in-
cidental to his employment". Palfrey v. Oconee County, 207 S. C.
433, 36 S. E. 2d 297 (1945). Also, the court in speaking of in-
juries which arise because of employment, in order to find the scope
of employment says, "The act should be construed with reasonable
liberality". Eargle v. S. C. Electric & Gas Co., 205 S. C. 423, 32
S. E. 2d 240 (1944). In many curiosity cases there is, at least, an
implied condition that to deny compensation, there must have been
knowledge by the employee that the situation was definitely danger-
ous. Bernier v. Greenville Mills, Inc., 93 N. H. 165, 37 A. 2d 5
(1944). However, the case which is heavily relied on in the instant
case does not mention knowledge, but states that an injury arises
out of the employment if it arises out of the nature, conditions, obli-
gations, or incidents of the employment; in other words, out of the
employment looked at in any of its aspects. Caswell's Case, 305
Mass. 500, 26 N. E. 2d 328, 330 (1940).
To one accustomed to tort actions against the employer, the in-
stant case looks illogical. However, when one looks at the fact that
the employer, under the Workman's Compensation Act, is actually
an insurer and that liability is not based on any fault of his own,
then the results of the case will appear to be more in keeping with
justice. The trend in the past several years has been to allow com-
pensation in similar cases, and to call this a liberal view does not
seem to be a proper usage of language. The Act was designed to
protect workmen while on the job, and to say that this man was not
on the job would not be a true statement by any means. Curiosity
is one of the most natural characteristics and the exercise of one's
curiosity can by no means be called a willful intention to injure him-
self or another, especially when there is no knowledge of danger.
Since there is nothing to establish that the employee was not in the
course of employment and there is no defense which will negative an
award, as the Act now reads, there could unquestionably be no other
decision than that at which the court arrived.
R. E. GRAYsoN.
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WILLS - COMPROMISE OF WILL CONTEST. - Validity
Where Minors Are Involved. Testator by his will left the bulk of
his estate to his second wife and her children to the exclusion of
his own children and heirs at law. The heirs at law moved to have
the will proved in solemn form and contested it on the grounds of
undue influence and mental incapacity. A compromise agreement
was entered into between the heirs at law and the beneficiaries un-
der the will which set forth the exact rights, properties and benefits
which would come to all devisees or beneficiaries under the will and
to all the heirs at law. This action was brought in equity to confirm
and enforce the agreement since minors are interested in the estate.
The lower court sustained the compromise agreement and the guardi-
ans ad litem of the infants appealed to submit the interests which
they represent to the court of last resort. HELD, Affirmed. The
compromising of a bona fide will contest is valid and binding on
the parties to the agreement; and if minors are involved, a court of
equity will confirm and enforce such agreement provided they are
before the court and their rights and interests are not injuriously
affected thereby. Peoples National Bank of Rock Hill v. Rogers,
-S. C -..-,61 S. E. 2d 391 (1950).
A compromise is an agreement made between two or more par-
ties as a settlement of matters in dispute. Durham v. Wadlington,
2 Strob. Eq. 258 (S. C. 1848). The compromise of any matter is
valid and binding, not because it is the settlement of a valid claim,
but because it is the settlement of a controversy. Smith v. Farra,
21 Ore. 395, 28 Pac. 241 (1891). The beneficiaries under a will
and the heirs at law of the testator have the authority to compromise
a contest involving the validity of the will and it is binding on the
parties. Seaman v. Colley, 178 Mass. 478, 59 N. E. 1017 (1901).
A bona fide agreement by one interested in the estate of a testator,
to refrain from contesting the will, is valid. It is not void as against
public policy, since it lessens litigation; and the forbearance to sue,
being a detriment to the promisee, is a sufficient consideration to sup-
port the promise. Utermekle v. Norment, 197 U. S. 40, 25 Sup.
Ct. 291, 49 L. Ed. 655 (1905). Whether the litigant would have
succeeded is not the test in determining the validity of a compromise
agreement. Seaman v. Seaman, 12 Wend. 381 (N. Y. 1834). The
only elements necessary to a valid agreement of compromise are the
reality of the claim made, and the bona fides of the compromise.
Grandin v. Grandin, 49 N. J. L. 508, 9 Atl. 756 (1887). Mutual
promises have been held to be sufficient consideration for an agree-
ment of compromise. Ford's Estate, 185 Pa. St. 420, 39 AtI. 1106
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(1898). Love and affection and the preservation of family harmony
among other things, were stated to be a consideration for a family
agreement. Bunn v. Bartlett, 54 Hun. 639, 28 N. Y. 239 (1889).
Compromise agreements have been held to be valid when made be-
fore the will was read. Brakefield v. Baldwin, 249 Ky. 106, 60 S. W.
2d 376 (1933). The court has power to sanction compromises in the
settlement of estates, or litigations generally, in which the property
rights of infants are concerned, and if court approves a compromise
after an examination of the facts, the judgment or decree is binding
upon the infant. Metzner v. Neunnan, 224 Mich. 324, 194 N. W.
1008 (1923). A court of equity -is bound to see that infants' rights
and interests are not injuriously affected by a contract of compro-
mise. Infants must be represented by guardians ad litern and must
have their day in court. Reynolds v. Brandon, 50 Tenn. 593. A
court of equity will not decree specific performance unless the com-
promise contract is fair, just and equitable, or if it fails to express-
the true agreement of the parties by fraud, accident, or mistake. Mc-
Chesney v. Smith, 105 S. C. 171, 89 S. R. 639 (1916). Where an
attorney acted upon an erroneous opinion of the law in signing a
compromise agreement, the devisee cannot have the agreement set
aside on the ground of mistake. Kirkland v. Moseley, 109 S. C. 477,
96 S. E. 608 (1917). Where a compromise of a doubtful right is
fairly made between the parties, whether the uncertainty rests upon
a doubt of fact, or a doubt in point of law, if both parties are in the
same ignorance the compromise is equally binding, and cannot be
affected by any subsequent investigation. White v. Hewitt, 86 S. C.
576, 68 S. E. 820 (1910).
A compromise may seem harsh upon its face if one only looks at
what the takers under the will would have received. But it is the
common sense and the equities involved, the saving of time and ex-
pense, and the preservation of family peace and harmony that make
a compromise bearable to the conscience. The case at hand offers
for consideration the delicate question of an agreement of compromise
where minors are involved. Surely their interests must be studied
and passed upon with care. They must be protected against those
who in the gratification of their own selfish desires would sacrifice
the rights of those not in the realm of knowing. The courts should
never treat this matter lightly by affirming a compromise merely be-
cause interested adults think the compromise agreement is to the best
interests of the minors. It should take into consideration what the
minor will receive udider the agreement, what he would have received
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under the will, and whether there actually was grounds for declaring
the will void. Here rights have been cut down on the one hand and
increased on the other. Our sense of justice is sometimes harsh,
sometimes liberal; the court seems to have chosen the latter.
MALCOL rm. Ri z.
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